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Executive Summary
Results-based financing (RBF) initiatives, which operate within the much larger financial and programming
contexts of health systems, aim to expand coverage, improve quality and reduce consumer financial
obligations at the country level in line with a nation’s decision to progress toward universal health coverage.
RBF programs have the potential to ensure that clients’ needs for quality services are met through use of
strategic incentives in health care provision and promoting more client-centered healthcare systems.
Performance-based financing (PBF) programs are considered a specific subset of RBF initiatives and are
distinguished by a focus on monetary incentives to healthcare providers for achieving agreed performance
measure under certain conditions. While both PBF, which uses financial disbursements to incentivize health
service delivery and quality, and rights-based programming have informed at different times efforts to
strengthen and scale FP services, there is has been little done to understand the linkages between PBF and a
rights-based approach (RBA) to FP services. To address this gap, a review of performance-based financing
(PBF) operations manuals was undertaken together with an analysis of PBF indicators relevant to FP services.
This paper reviews country-generated PBF operational documents to assess whether existing FP indicators
are sensitive to the principles associated with an RBA.
As the result of an evidence mapping via consultation with the PBF community of practice, the review
identified 23 PBF operational and assessed the sensitivity of FP services in those PBF programs to eight
rights principles recognized by the World Health Organization. The review found that rights were not
uniformly represented across the 23 PBF programs. The most commonly identified rights principlesaccountability and quality – are features of most FP services in the 23 PBF programs identified in this review.
Less commonly represented rights included accessibility, acceptability, and informed choice. None of the 23
programs spoke to agency / voluntarism in their FP services.
From the review of operational and implementation manuals produced in-country, this report demonstrates
that current PBF programs are not designed with a rights-based approach and that PBF guidelines could
better reflect the importance of patient-centered, rights-based programming. Given the mixed evidence for
PBF benefits, concerns about poor country ownership of PBF programs, and a risk of perverse incentives in
early versions of PBF programs that did not take have a systematic alignment with rights-based approaches,
greater attention to the rights principles of acceptability, accessibility, availability, and quality; accountability;
agency and empowerment; equity and non-discrimination; informed choice and decision-making;
participation; and privacy and confidentiality would improve health service delivery and health system
performance for all stakeholders with consumers at the center.
Key recommendations include the need to assess the rights principles gaps in current PBF programs; build
consensus on integrating rights principles into PBF trainings, program design, and implementation; and
launch an iterative learning agenda to improve the operationalization of rights principles in PBF programs.
From the results presented here, there is a clear opportunity for PBF programs to more explicitly and
systematically address rights principles. How rights principles are incorporated into implementation will
require a thoughtful, iterative approach that accounts for contextual variation. Determining the programmatic
structure of a fully operational rights-based approach in any PBF program is guided by international
agreement on a rights principles framework for family planning programs as well as local stakeholder
contextualization in the respective health system.
Given its centrality to funding through the GFF partners, PBF for FP services will have significant
implications on the abilities of women and couples to choose if, when, and how many children to bear in
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their lifetimes. Placing consumers at the heart of services and ensuring they are always prioritized and
protected when designing, planning, and implementing PBF programs is critical to ensuring that people are
able to make their own decisions about FP use and to sustaining PBF programs, particularly in countries
supported by GFF.
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Introduction
BACKGROUND
Expanding access to and use of voluntary family planning (FP) services is a well-established global health
goal-- it is a specific target under the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) of good health and well-being, an
integral component of Every Woman Every Child (EWEC), and the overall objective of the Family Planning
2020 (FP2020) partnership, among other initiatives (United Nations, n.d.; Every Woman Every Child, 2016;
Family Planning 2020, 2017). FP2020, the global partnership to achieve the ambitious goal of increasing
access to voluntary FP for an additional 120 million users, supports and encourages voluntary FP policies and
programs that focus on ensuring individuals and couples can freely and responsibly decide the number and
spacing of children, with the aid of quality voluntary FP information and services and without facing
discrimination (Family Planning 2020, 2018). However, significant barriers inhibit many people from using
voluntary FP services to help meet their reproductive intentions. An indication of this is the estimated 214
million women who want to delay having more children or have born the children they want to have but are
not using contraception (Guttmacher Institute, 2017).
One promising approach for achieving global voluntary FP goals is performance-based financing (PBF),
which deploys financial incentives to the health system to improve service availability, utilization, and quality
as well as addressing some public financial management bottlenecks by directly targeting resources to facilities
based on performance. Described below, PBF falls under the broader and related rubric of results-based
financing (RBF), which includes performance-based incentives (PBI) and pay for performance (P4P), as well
as demand-side initiatives like vouchers (Musgrove, 2011). PBF is one of the financing instruments used by
the recently created Global Financing Facility in support of Every Women Every Child (GFF). Housed at the
World Bank, GFF is a partnership of funders, technical agencies, civil society organizations, and private
sector entities focused on women and child health.
PBF programs, operating within the much larger financial contexts of health systems, aim to expand
coverage, improve quality, and reduce consumer financial obligations in line with progress toward universal
health coverage (Kutzin, 2013; Wagstaff et al., 2015). Although the evidence is mixed, some PBF and RBF
studies have shown significant positive effects, including expanding coverage, lowering costs, increasing value
for money, and increasing the overall efficiency and quality of health systems (Basinga et al., 2011; Bellows,
Askew, & Bellows, 2014; Bertone, Lagarde, & Witter, 2016; Blacklock et al., 2016; Grittner, 2013; Soeters et
al., 2011). At the same time, there is a move towards operationalizing rights-based approaches in health
services and programs to better meet clients’ needs and the state’s obligations (Family Planning 2020, 2014;
Hardee, Kumar, et al., 2014; WHO, 2014). PBF programs have the potential to ensure that a client-centered
approach is upheld through use of strategic incentives in healthcare provision that promote quality of care,
informed choice, and voluntarism, among other program attributes. Thus far, however, family planning
services in PBF programs have often been supported via incentives for enrolling new contraceptive users or
improving access to methods, with less attention to metrics that would reflect client empowerment or
voluntarism.
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What is performance-based financing?
Performance-based financing is a health financing instrument through which payments are made for
health services to healthcare providers conditional on performance on predefined and verified
quantity indicators, adjusted for measures of quality.

What is a rights-based approach to family planning?
A rights-based approach to family planning uses a set of standards and principles to guide program
assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation that enables individuals and
couples to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children, to have the
information and services to do so, and to be treated equitably and free of discrimination. (Erdman &
Cook, 2008)

There are questions about the suitability of PBF for family planning services due to the potential for perverse
incentivizing, e.g. offering “rewards” for achieving contracted outputs could have unanticipated or
undesirable effects. These may include (a) health service actors ignoring unincentivized health interventions
or cherry-picking services that pay the highest incentives, (b) inducing superfluous demand for incentivized
services, and (c) fraudulent reporting although World Bank funded studies have not reported these types of
adverse events to date (Chowdhury et al., 2013; Paul et al., 2018a; Kandpal, 2016).
Rewarding certain behaviors and setting certain kinds of targets can encourage actions that infringe on clients’
autonomous and informed decision-making. Financial rewards can affect how providers share information
with clients, alter privacy and confidentiality protections, and induce changes in the patient-provider
relationship through structural and procedural biases (Eichler, Levine, & The Performance-Based Incentives
Working Group, 2009; Eichler et al., 2010). At worst under PBF, providers could pressure clients into taking
any given services (Hardee, Harris, et al., 2014). The World Health Organization (WHO) has recommended
that:

“In settings where PBF occurs, a system of checks and balances
should be in place, including assurance of non-coercion... If PBF
occurs, research should be conducted to evaluate its effectiveness and
its impact on clients in terms of increasing contraceptive availability”
(WHO, 2014)
Where family planning is concerned, significant efforts have been made to ensure that patient autonomy and
protection are foremost in service delivery.

PURPOSE
Given the confluence of potential benefits of PBF to expand access to and improve quality of FP services,
the potential risks for perverse provider incentives, and the global imperative to implement rights-based
approaches to health programs, this paper reviews country-generated PBF operational documents to
determine whether and the extent to which rights principles are currently considered and included in PBF
program designs. The report focuses on the current state of operational and performance measures specific
to FP services within PBF programs, identifying whether and how these principles are embedded in these
financial schemes, now often cofinanced under the new GFF. Acknowledging that the documents that form
the evidence of this review largely pre-date the GFF, the report is an opportunity to learn from what went
before and iteratively improve from lessons to be drawn here.
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The paper examines the structure of PBF beyond performance measures and indicators, analyzing the
language used throughout the implementation manuals, including available memoranda of understanding.
Additionally, this review identifies gaps where greater attention to client-centered features, most notably
quality of care, informed choice, and voluntarism, all components of rights-based programming, could
strengthen PBF operations and offers recommendations for improvements.
The review begins with (a) a brief overview of PBF and its new support mechanism within the World Bank
followed by (b) a description of the components of a rights-based approach to FP to provide context for (c)
the subsequent focus on quality, informed choice, and voluntarism. A companion paper focuses on the
indicators used in PBF (Boydell et al., 2018).
The World Bank and other partners have now made extensive use of PBF to deliver FP services among a
range of instruments and many countries are expanding PBF with the support of the GFF. Although most of
the documents reviewed pre-date, and in a few cases draw from programs not directly supported by, the
GFF, this report makes several recommendations to ensure that rights are central to the discussion among
development partners and governments implementing PBF and related service purchasing strategies. The
lessons from PBF will have some applicability in other investment instruments and purchasing approaches:
development impact bonds, Program for Results loans, performance contracting, and national and social
insurance schemes.

RESULTS-BASED FINANCING AND THE GLOBAL FINANCING
FACILITY
RBF is defined as:

“A cash payment or nonmonetary transfer made to a national or
subnational government, manager, provider, payer, or consumer of
health services after predefined results have been attained and
verified. Payment is conditional on measurable actions being
undertaken” (Musgrove, 2011)
RBF programs are organized such that incentives, typically monetary, are provided to health system actors
(supply-side) or healthcare consumers (demand-side) in exchange for or in anticipation of targeted behavioral
changes. A contract outlines the roles of the payer and the recipient as well as the expected outcomes, and the
reported outcomes are verified by an independent third party before any payments are made. With this
approach, money for health systems shifts from funding inputs (e.g. salaries and commodities) to paying for
verifiable outputs achieved through direct service provision or observable health-related consumer behaviors.
On the supply side, health system actors may receive incentives for high performance or results, i.e. the
attainment of specified healthcare outputs among the population served. Healthcare consumers, on the other
hand, might receive incentives for demonstrating positive health behaviors, such as attending health
education seminars or accessing health services. Consumers may receive vouchers that subsidize access to
priority services and providers reimbursed for services delivered. These strategies link financial compensation
to the achievement of health program priorities, with the goal of increasing the use, quality, and efficiency of
health services. This review focuses on supply-side initiatives that are labeled performance-based financing
(PBF), which focuses on monetary incentives to healthcare providers for performance under agreed
conditions.
Since 2007, PBF for maternal and child health has been supported by the Health Results Innovation Trust
Fund (HRITF), which is maintained by the governments of Norway and the United Kingdom and
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administered by the World Bank. It has committed funds through 2022. In 2014, building on the success of
the HRITF, the UN General Assembly launched the GFF. The GFF partnership aims to provide and
coordinate additional support and funding explicitly for reproductive, maternal, newborn, child, and
adolescent health (RMNCAH) in the 63 highest-burden low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) (World
Bank Group, 2014). The GFF has become a flagship mechanism for supporting the provision of RMNCAH
services, including voluntary FP, in many countries. Through it, PBF is one of the primary means of ensuring
transparency and accountability (World Bank, 2015).
The GFF is a move away from traditional bilateral development assistance models towards donor pooling of
financial resources to promote country-led ownership of RMNCAH. It combines domestic resources with
financing from both the International Development Association and the International Bank of
Reconstruction and Development, bilateral donors, other external financing, and private sector resources.
The GFF Trust Fund is an additional source of funding that increases the volume of financing in order to
close the estimated US$33.3 billion resource gap for RMNCAH among the countries eligible for GFF
support, allowing for scale up of priority services (World Bank, 2015). There is renewed emphasis on
increasing both efficiency in funding and the value for money disbursed. As domestic financing sources
increase their contributions, it is expected that the need for external grants to recipient countries will be
reduced. As much as the GFF represents a financing partnership between external donors and domestic
governments, it also represents a unique opportunity to prospectively strengthen rights principles in the
design and implementation of GFF-supported health sector investment strategies, particularly PBF programs.
Early publications on the role of PBF in strengthening FP service provision were mostly primers, toolkits,
and handbooks developed or funded by the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
These do not explicitly discuss rights-based programming in funding schemes, although the World Bank
mentions other legal rights related to the receipt of FP services (Loevinsohn, 2008). Eichler and colleagues
examined country-specific strategies to prevent coercion in the provision of incentivized FP services (Eichler
et al., 2009). In 2010, evaluations and case studies more openly began to discuss aspects of clients’ rights in
FP programs under PBF, although they did not use the term “rights.” Two key documents that examined the
role of incentives in FP services (Eichler et al., 2009, 2010) mentioned voluntarism and informed choice as
clients’ rights and coincided with the World Bank’s launch of its Reproductive Health Action Plan (20102015), an operationalization of the reproductive health component of its 2009 Health, Nutrition, and
Population (HNP) Strategy. Yet, the Reproductive Health Action Plan does not explicitly mention rightsbased programming. Instead, it notes that it will focus on strengthening healthcare systems to “ensure access
to quality family planning and other reproductive health services, skilled birth attendance, emergency obstetric
care, and postnatal care for mothers and newborns” (World Bank, 2010: 25). While access and quality are
important components of a rights-based approach, they are two of many rights principles, noted in the
following section of this paper. In 2013, the World Bank published an HNP paper on the ethical dimensions
of FP services in RBF programs including PBF initiatives, which explored the risks and responses to
incentives vis-a-vis FP services. Although it mentioned voluntarism and informed choice, other rights were
not discussed (Chowdhury et al., 2013).
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A Rights-Based Approach to Health and
Family Planning
A rights-based approach to FP and reproductive health advises the use of rights, rooted in consumers’
reproductive desires and needs, as a set of standards and principles to guide program assessment, planning,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. This approach underscores the importance of the individual
within a broader social and cultural context for FP service delivery (Hardee, Harris, et al., 2014).
There is increasing consensus that the principles most imperative to voluntary family planning are
acceptability, accessibility, availability, and quality (commonly referred to as AAAQ), as well as (a)
accountability, (b) agency, autonomy, and empowerment, (c) equity and non-discrimination, (d) informed
choice/informed decision-making, (e) participation, and (f) privacy and confidentiality (Family Planning 2020,
2014; WHO, 2014; UNCESCR, 2000) (table 1). Unique dimensions of voluntarism are found among these
different principles as well (Kumur et al., 2017; Hardee, Harris, et al., 2014). PBF programs have the potential
to ensure that clients’ needs for quality services are met through the use of strategic incentives in healthcare
provision and promote more client-centered healthcare systems.

Rights Element
Accessibility

Acceptability

Accountability/
Participation/
Transparency

Agency/
Autonomy/
Empowerment/
Voluntarism

Availability

Implications for family planning programs
Geographic, physical, financial, and policy access (i.e., absence of
nonmedical eligibility criteria); information is available in the
languages and terms people can understand; continuous
contraceptive security; suitable hours of operation; service
integration to increase access
Culturally appropriate facilities, methods, and services;
community/family support for women’s ability to choose, switch, or
stop method of contraception; tolerance of side effects; privacy and
confidentiality respected; client satisfaction with services
Mechanisms exist for community members and FP clients to
provide input and feedback about services, and for the health
system to investigate and remedy allegations of/confirmed
violations of rights; members of the community are involved in
planning and monitoring FP services; good governance and
effective implementation, providing an environment that facilitates
the discharge of all responsibilities; and the ability to readily access
meaningful information, including de-identified data
Knowledge that one has the right to make decisions about
healthcare; ability to make one’s own decisions independent of
system, spouse, family, or community pressures; informed,
voluntary decision-making supported; meaningful participation of
clients in program design and monitoring; client-controlled methods
offered; supportive community gender norms; women/men/young
people know to and ask for services based on their needs, within
their rights
Broad choice of methods offered; sufficient and needs-based
distribution at functioning service delivery points
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Informed choice/
Informed decision-making
Non-discrimination/Equity

Quality (including privacy and
confidentiality)
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Women and youth make own decisions about whether and what
method of FP to use, without pressure from anyone, with free
access to accurate information they can understand and a range of
options to choose from
Everyone, no matter what group they come from, age, or any other
circumstance, has the same access to quality information and
services; everyone is treated fairly and the same
Service providers are well trained and provide safe services, treat
clients with respect, provide good counseling, and protect client
privacy and confidentiality (ensuring client information cannot be
observed or heard by anyone else without the client’s consent;
ensuring client records are not shared with anyone and information
is not disclosed); and have a regular supply of contraceptives and
all necessary equipment to provide the services clients want

Review of Country PBF Operational
Documents
METHODS
An evidence mapping of PBF operational documents was undertaken through web search and consultation
with experts. The aim was to collect and summarize as much evidence as possible and to map results to
general concepts or research areas (Arksey and O’Malley 2005; Dijkers 2011). Acknowledging that the
documents were drawn from programs that largely pre-date the GFF, the value of evidence mapping is that it
is a systematic search extracting from a wide range of materials on specific questions of interest for policy and
program implementation.
A review of PBF operational documents was undertaken from November to December 2017. These
operational documents have programming guidance and tend not to be discoverable through professional
literature databases and not uniformly available via search engines. The search focused on the World Bank
Group’s results-based financing website (https://www.rbfhealth.org), which served as a repository for PBF
documentation, followed by a request to experts at the PBF Community of Practice Google and Collectivity
groups to share other documentation of PBF guidance that were not housed on the World Bank website. It
was not possible to source all expected operational manuals as they were not readily available in the public
domain. The exploration identified 23 relevant documents (one each from 23 countries) in English and
French.
All the documents are the most recent, publicly available versions of operational or implementation manuals.
From these, we extracted concepts, procedures, and performance measures that specify or reflect the
principles presented in Table 1. While the paper focuses on FP-related PBF elements, the extracted data was
not exclusively focused on FP-specific elements in the documents. For example, the availability of
commodities is not necessarily specific to contraceptives but potentially inclusive of them. Some of the
connections between content in the documents and the rights principles are intuited; this reflects the lack of
clear intent on which some activities or procedures are based, but also provides a foundation for further
operationalization of a rights-based approach that can ensure high quality services, informed choice, and
voluntarism in PBF programs. Information from the documents was sorted by the eight principles, or
groupings thereof, per country, with an additional section for relevant but miscellaneous findings.
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Findings
The manuals reviewed were produced between 2009 and 2015, the majority before the creation of the GFF.
Of the 23 PBF program implementation documents reviewed, 21 manuals mention or include FP. All the
documents reviewed focused largely on the implementation of quality and accountability mechanisms for the
financing programs. A few program documents attempted to address issues of accessibility, availability,
informed choice, acceptability, and non-discrimination/equity. There was no operational inclusion of agency,
autonomy, empowerment, or voluntarism of healthcare consumers. Table 2 provides an overview of the
principles that were included in each of the reviewed country PBF operational and implementation manuals.
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Table 2: Indication of Principles associated with a Rights-based Approach in PBF Operational/Implementation Manuals from 23 LMICs

Accessibility

Acceptability

Afghanistan

Argentina

x

Accountability/
Transparency/
Participation

Nondiscrimination/
Equity

Quality
(including
privacy &
confidentiality)

x

x

x

x

x

x

Benin

x

Burkina Faso

x

Burundi

x

x

Availability

Informed
Choice/
Informed
decisionmaking

x

Armenia

Cameroon

Agency/
Autonomy/
Empowerment/
Voluntarism

x

PBF
program
has FP
incentive

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Manual

(Operations Manual:
Results Based
Financing
Intervention in BPHS
Facilities and
Hospitals in
Afghanistan, n.d.)
(Cortez, Romero
Vanina Camporeale,
& Perez, 2012)
(Republic of Armenia
Ministry of Health,
2014)
(République du Bénin
Ministère de la Santé,
Secrétariat Général
du Ministère, &
Programme de
Renforcement du
Système de Santé,
2014)
(Burkina Faso
Ministere de la Sante,
2013)
(Republique du
Burundi Ministere de
la Sante Publique,
2010)
(Consortium
AEDES/IRESCO,
2012)
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Djibouti

x

x

DRC

x

x

x

Haiti

x

x

x

Ivory Coast

x

Kenya

x

Lesotho

x

x

x

x

x

x

Liberia

x

Mali

x

Mozambique

x
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x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

(Republique de
Djbouti Ministere de
la Sante, 2014)
(Republique
Democratique du
Congo Ministere de la
Sante Publique
Secértariat Général,
2015)
(République d’Haiti
Ministere de la Santé
Publique et de la
Population, 2013)
(République de Cote
D’Ivoire Ministere de
la Sante et de la
Lutte contre le Sida,
2014)
(The Government of
Kenya The Ministry of
Health, 2013)
(Lesotho Ministry of
Health, 2013)
(Republic of Liberia
Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare,
2012)
(Republique du Mali
Ministere de la Sante,
2011)
(Institute for
Collaborative
Development, 2015)

Nigeria

x

Rwanda

x

x

Sierra Leone

x

Tajikistan

x

x

Zambia

x

TOTAL
(of 23)

6

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

19

21

x

Senegal

Tanzania

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
4

23

0

6

4

7

(Federal Ministry of
Health, Ondo
Nasarawa and
Adamawa State
Ministries of Health,
National Primary
Healthcare
Development Agency,
Ondo State Primary
Healthcare
Development Board,
& Nasarawa and
Adamawa State
Primary Healthcare
Development
Agencies, 2013)
(Republic of Rwanda
Ministry of Health,
2009)
(Republique du
Senegal Ministere de
la Sante de l’Hygiene
Publique et de la
Prevention, 2012)
(Government of
Sierra Leone, 2012)
(Republic of
Tajikistan Ministry of
Health and Social
Protection, 2014)
(The United Republic
of Tanzania Ministry
of Health and Social
Welfare, 2015)
(Zambia Ministry of
Health & The World
Bank, 2011)
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A summary of how each of the principles is reflected in the manuals follows. Each subsection begins with the
definition of the principle, also provided in Table 1, followed by a description of what was captured in the
operational documents across countries.

ACCESSIBILITY
Definition: Geographic, physical, financial, and policy access (i.e., absence of nonmedical eligibility criteria); information
is available in the languages and terms people can understand; continuous contraceptive security; suitable hours of
operation; service integration to increase access
The most forward-looking PBF programs fostered greater access by (a) integrating community health
extension services, (b) testing financial subsidies, and (c) insisting on a greater customer experience. Six of the
PBF documents reviewed included issues of accessibility to family planning services or the larger incentivized
health program. The main dimensions that frame healthcare access in these manuals are physical and
geographic. Five of the 23 PBF programs included incentives to increase physical access to family planning
services. In Mozambique’s scheme, not financed by World Bank, health facilities selected for participation in
its PBF program include peripheral health centers, referral hospitals, and mobile clinics (Institute for
Collaborative Development, 2015). Lesotho’s health system utilizes village health workers (VHW) as the
fourth tier of service provision. Under the country’s PBF program, VHWs are trained and used as extensions
of health centers, conducting services from the Essential Services Package, which includes FP, and reporting
back to health centers. A component of their health center contracts is that they hire and make use of VHWs
and VHWs complete their responsibilities. The VHW and health center are considered a unit to which
incentives are made; payments to VHWs are made based on both their performances and that of their
respective health centers. The training and deployment of VHWs brings services to more remote areas,
increasing physical and geographic accessibility of services for hard-to-reach communities (Lesotho Ministry
of Health, 2013). Similarly, one of Tanzania’s health facility quantity indicators on the country’s PBF
performance agreement is the number of households visited by community health workers (CHW) (The
United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2015). Additionally, health providers
based at more remote health centers in Zambia are incentivized with higher monthly PBF incentives for the
provision of FP services (Zambia Ministry of Health & World Bank, 2011). Kenya’s PBF operational manual
for scale up lists an indicator for the number of counties with defined strategies for increasing access and
utilization of RMNCAH services as a measure tied to incentives, but it does not define a good strategy
(Government of Kenya Ministry of Health, 2013).
Two country manuals address economic barriers to accessing healthcare services in their PBF programs. In
Argentina, there are no client premiums at the points of service, so healthcare is “free” for consumers (Cortez
et al., 2012). Tanzania’s PBF program seeks information directly from clients regarding the costs of services
received and whether the client was receiving benefits from the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF). Its
PBF Client Satisfaction Questionnaire asks, “Did you find the cost of care/services financially reasonable and
affordable to you?” gauging the user’s ability to pay for services (accessibility).
Information access for healthcare users is not directly incentivized or accounted for in any of the PBF
documents reviewed.
In summary, findings were mostly around performance measures used to assess and reward geographic reach,
and a couple of programs accounted for financial access. These are generally related to expansion of service
delivery points rather than the recruitment of consumers in those localities. No measures were in place for
information access for healthcare users, but there are some related indicators captured under “Acceptability”.
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ACCEPTABILITY
Definition: Culturally appropriate facilities, methods, and services; community/family support for women’s ability to
choose, switch, or stop method of contraception; tolerance of side effects; privacy and confidentiality respected; client
satisfaction with services.
Four out of the 23 manuals addressed issues of acceptability. Cameroon’s implementation manual has several
indicators that reflect the desire and need for, and the tolerability of, various FP services among the recipient
populations. For instance, it counts the total number of old and new FP acceptors currently on oral pills or
injection, a fairly common FP output indicator that appears across programs, although programs may
quantify acceptors for different contraceptive methods. Cameroon also collects the number of new cases of
implants and/or IUDs, post-abortive curettage, and tubal ligation or vasectomies (Consortium
AEDES/IRESCO, 2012).
Some of the programs seek to consider client waiting times at health facilities. Cameroon’s PBF verification
form includes questions about the length of wait times and the client perceptions of wait times – “How did
the mother appreciate the time?” – while Lesotho asks similar questions and also includes a question about
whether the wait time had an effect on the client or the child’s health (Consortium AEDES/IRESCO, 2012;
Lesotho Ministry of Health, 2013).
Cameroon and Lesotho also give attention to client financial acceptability. Both countries’ verification forms
include questions about whether and how much money was paid for services and what healthcare users think
about the payments made (see Tanzania example on affordability under Accessibility).
Lesotho also made efforts to increase community acceptability, alongside accessibility, by rewarding the
VHWs for community sensitization outreach. Rwanda’s PBF program similarly incentivizes community
sensitization via CHWs to encourage healthcare utilization. For FP, CHW outreach seeks to sensitize women
to benefits of long-term methods and to expand contraceptive options for consumers (Republic of Rwanda
Ministry of Health, 2009).
Tanzania gauges clients’ perceptions about the attention and approachability of its health facility providers.
The Client Satisfaction Questionnaire asks: “When being attended to, were the medical staffs taking time to
listen to you carefully?” “Was the staff at the facility caring, friendly and welcoming?” and “Did the medical
staffs at the facility explain matters to you appropriately?”
In summary, there are performance measures related to new acceptors, community sensitization, and quality;
and verification related to service appropriateness linked to wait time, costs, and satisfaction with care
provision. Among the subset of PBF programs to address acceptability, all managed to cover its multiple
dimensions.

ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND PARTICIPATION
Definition: Mechanisms exist for community members and FP clients to provide input and feedback about services, and
for health system to investigate and remedy allegations of/confirmed violations of rights; members of the community are
involved in planning and monitoring FP services; good governance and effective implementation, providing an
environment that facilitates the discharge of all responsibilities; and the ability to readily access meaningful information,
including de-identified data
Given the centrality of contract and verification practices of PBF programs, all the PBF operational manuals
included accountability measures to ensure appropriate and effective implementation and transparent
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governance of their respective PBF programs. In addition to the standard third-party verifications required by
the RPBF model, countries such as Afghanistan, Argentina, Benin, and Kenya also conduct internal audits
regularly over the course of the year. Many of the countries require routine work plans, often quarterly, that
inform continuous monitoring and evaluation plans. Monitoring and evaluation activities are common among
many of the reviewed program manuals. Additionally, many programs request business plans from levels as
high as the ministries in charge down to the implementing health facilities, often updated on a regular basis;
as well as systematic monthly, quarterly, or semi-annual performance reports due to and from different
entities.
The roles and responsibilities of personnel were also dictated in the operations manuals. Most countries
highlighted a separation of power and functions for managing the PBF programs, seemingly to insure against
the perception of containing power by a few or at one level of authority. Some countries convened
coordination or steering committees to guide and supervise the implementation of PBF programs.
Afghanistan, Armenia, and Djibouti are among those countries, each of which specifies the tasks for each
group. Additionally, other roles were plainly set and defined. Kenya overtly distinguished between the
regulator, fund holder, purchaser, internal and external verifiers, and service providers. Liberia and Nigeria
also provided similar levels of detail.
Given the financial rewards provided by PBF programs, some programs defined possible penalties. Benin,
Nigeria, and Kenya all spoke to the potential for sanctions around issues such as fraud or negligence, mostly
at the service provision level. It was interesting to note the absence of sanctions for fraud at higher
administrative levels.
Client participation in accountability measures was also significant across program designs. Most of the
verification processes include client satisfaction surveys to ensure that services were indeed provided and to
consider how fulfilling the experience was for healthcare users. In addition to in-person surveys and
interviews, Sierra Leone also has a hospital level indicator for “management of patients’ complaints and
suggestion box,” making it possible for more anonymous feedback.
In summary, there are extensive and robust accountability systems with penalties and sanctions built into PBF
programs. Structures are in place to ensure responsibilities are set out, discharged, verified, and rewarded or
penalized. However, these are mostly upward-oriented accountability systems to ensure system performance.
There is little reference to consumer and community participation and feedback mechanisms, whether
suggestion boxes, hearings, or health committees.

AGENCY/AUTONOMY/EMPOWERMENT/VOLUNTARISM
Definition: Knowledge that one has the right to make decisions about healthcare; ability to make one’s own decisions
independent of system, spouse, family, or community pressures; informed, voluntary decision-making supported;
meaningful participation of clients in program design and monitoring; client-controlled methods offered; supportive
community gender norms; women/men/young people know to and ask for services based on their needs, within their
rights.
While there was discussion of autonomy in terms of PBF programs giving more agency to health service
actors at points of service, there was no discussion of client agency or autonomy in any of the reviewed PBF
operational documents. The distinction is an important point to make in discussing rights to agency,
autonomy, empowerment and voluntarism. A program design that supports access to client-controlled
methods does not signal the existence of these (unspoken) rights in that program. An explicit
acknowledgment of a client’s right to agency, autonomy, empowerment, and voluntarism is needed to ensure
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that program implementers are (a) aware of these rights and (b) understand why client-controlled methods or
other rights-enhancing attributes in the PBF program are important for effective FP service delivery.

AVAILABILITY
Definition: Broad choice of methods offered; sufficient and needs-based distribution at functioning service delivery points.
Only six of the 23 country documents addressed the principle of availability. Of these programs, there was a
focus on the availability of commodities, and several programs reported available personnel skilled in the
provision of specific services.
In Benin, commodities are measured, inspected, and verified by ministry inspectors and community-based
representatives. Nigeria also has indicators for the availability and visibility of FP methods; for having an
“adequate” stock of pills, injectables, implants, and IUDs; and for vasectomies and tubal ligations. Lesotho’s
PBF manual plainly states indicators for “at least five IUDs and five implants available” and “at least three
months’ stock of oral and injectable contraceptives”. Sierra Leone includes the availability of vital and tracer
drugs and consumables as well as stock out delays as hospital indicators. Inventory records and summary
reports are also listed as hospital indicators related to the availability of commodities. In Tanzania’s program,
verification includes direct observation of rooms used for FP services and the supplies for six contraceptive
methods. Additionally, Tanzania and Lesotho also verify availability through client questionnaires. The
Lesotho manual asks, “Were the medicines prescribed for you available at the hospital?” while Tanzania’s
asks, “Have you ever gone home without medication because they were out of stock?”
Many of the operational documents spoke to measuring the numbers of trained and working staff. Lesotho’s
program requires at least one trained staff member for each implant method and for IUD insertion, and it
also has a staff performance measure of “never absent from service without known or valid motive.”
Likewise, Sierra Leone has a “cross-cutting quality adjustment criteri[on]” of attendance at work. Tanzania’s
program has a broader indicator for providers than Lesotho’s, measuring the availability of trained FP
providers through their quality assessment tool for dispensaries and health centers. In Kenya, alongside
counting the number of qualified staff employed by health facilities and deployed in each of its counties, the
program also counts the number of counties implementing a community-based RMNCAH strategy, the
number of counties with defined strategies for increasing access and utilization of RMNCAH services, and
the percentage of counties fully implementing those strategies (also see Accessibility).
In summary, there are a range of performance indicators related to the availability of supplies in addition to
some quality and verification procedures. There are also indicators and procedures to ensure an adequate
distribution of appropriately trained staff. However, there was limited discussion on the importance of
measuring method mix, which is critical metric underlying functional consumer choice.

INFORMED CHOICE/INFORMED DECISION-MAKING
Definition: Women and youth make own decisions about whether and what method of FP to use, without pressure from
anyone, with free access to accurate information they can understand and a range of options to choose from.
Four PBF operational manuals address issues of informed choice. Tanzania’s program states that it included
questions about informed choice around FP methods in its client exit interviews, conducted at random within
health facilities. The country’s quality and verification questions include:
§

“What methods were you taught? [Must be able to name 3 of the following: condoms, injectables,
pills, implants, IUCDs]”; and
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§

“Did you receive your method of choice or advised which methods were appropriate for you
following examination today? If not, were you provided information on where you could receive the
method, or referred to a facility or outreach service where the method is provided?”

The questions are scored 1 point for a “yes” response and 0 or 1 point for a “no” response.
Cameroon’s household survey form used for service verification asks if a price list was displayed in the health
facility and if the health staff explained and presented all the existing modern methods to the client and
allowed her to choose one freely. Similarly, Lesotho measures whether and which FP methods (injections,
implants, IUDs, pills, male and female condoms) were available for demonstrations to clients. Further, Sierra
Leone’s PBF program expects direct observations and reports about the organization of health education
sessions and information provided to patients, “including patient circuit for getting services, schedules.”
In summary, there were performance and quality measures as well as verification procedures assessing and
rewarding whether and how much information was shared. However, only the Tanzania PBF program
attempted to assess if the information was understood by consumers.

NON-DISCRIMINATION/EQUITY
Definition: Everyone, no matter what group they come from, age, or any other circumstance, has the same access to
quality information and services; everyone is treated fairly and the same
Four of the 23 PBF manuals addressed equity and nondiscrimination standards within their programs. Three
of the four were concerned with reaching groups based on income or wealth scores, and one was concerned
with indigenous groups.
Afghanistan is utilizing an equity of care concentration index, in which a score of zero indicates equal
utilization of services by all wealth groups, a negative number indicates that lower income groups are utilizing
services at higher rates, and a positive number indicates that wealthier groups are utilizing services more. This
is measured at the provincial level along with the contraceptive prevalence rate, whereas all other indicators
for the country’s PBF program are measured at the health facility level. Funds are similarly paid at the
provincial level for achievements related to these indicators (Operations Manual: Results Based Financing
Intervention in BPHS Facilities and Hospitals in Afghanistan, n.d.).
PBF programs in Nigeria and Tanzania are also focused on low-income groups. The Nigeria PBF program
takes place at the state level with the parastatal state primary healthcare development agency (SPHCDA)
acting as the purchaser. The SPHCDA incentivizes household visits and providing allowable free healthcare
for select impoverished populations. Its indicators include a category labeled “new consultation for an
indigent patient,” signifying that the poorest people can access health services without service fees (Federal
Ministry of Health et al., 2013). Tanzania is prioritizing enrolling regions with poor health outcomes and
higher poverty indices in its PBF program. One indicator measures the number of low-income individuals (a)
registered in its system, (b) attending, and (c) receiving outpatient services during a defined period (The
United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2015).
In a different way, Argentina is incentivizing the increase of coverage to indigenous populations. Coverage is
indicated by the number of providers who deliver services to eligible indigenous populations, with personnel
trained in specific cultures and health needs (Cortez et al., 2012).
In summary, there are indications that some PBF programs are attempting to assess and reward providers’
performance based on income and/or ethnicity of consumers. However, there was no discussion of other
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forms of social disadvantage that are known to affect access to family planning for other underserved or
disadvantaged groups, such as youth.

QUALITY, INCLUDING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Definition: Service providers are well trained and provide safe services, treat clients with respect, provide good counseling,
and protect client privacy and confidentiality (ensuring client information cannot be observed or heard by anyone else
without the client’s consent; ensuring client records are not shared with anyone and information is not disclosed); and a
regular supply of contraceptives and all necessary equipment to provide the services clients want.
Nineteen of the 23 PBF operational manuals explicitly mention quality at least once, if not throughout the
document. Some manuals simply state that they will monitor and verify quality of care and quality control of
processes (Afghanistan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda). Others, such as Argentina
and Cameroon, demarcate quality. Argentina’s Plan Nacer states that the five dimensions of quality are (1)
enrollment, (2) knowledge of benefit plans, (3) first-level attention and hospitalization assessment, (4) nurse
and doctor assessment, and (5) utilization of system complaints. Cameroon’s PBF program identifies two
types of quality standards: (1) a minimal threshold of quality standards for output payment and (2) a
minimum adequate level of quality standards to be eligible for a quality bonus. Mali’s PBF Procedure Manual
states that its PBF objective is to improve the quality and quantity of long-acting reversible contraceptives
and prenatal and antenatal care; quality is the program’s overarching mission.
Among the 19 manuals that discuss quality, the degree to which quality is operationalized varies. Some
manuals detail internal processes to monitor and evaluate quality, which are distinct from external verification
procedures outlined in several manuals. For example, Benin’s program requires a commitment to regular
quality evaluations of health facilities that will be conducted by health inspectors and regular evaluations of
quality of care provided by community-based volunteers. Sierra Leone will also conduct quality assessments
on the maintenance of appropriate standards of cleanliness, cleaning of facilities, hygiene, and sanitation
indicators. In Zambia, to avoid incentivized indicators becoming the centerpiece to the detriment of all other
health indicators, the non-incentivized indicators will also be routinely monitored. The aim is to ensure that
improvements in indicators are comprehensive and not biased towards those that are incentivized. This is
monitored with a Quality Audit by the District or General Hospital, and FP indicators are included and
weighted.
As well, many of the PBF manuals included or referenced quality assessments or assurance checklists. These
checklists tally scores to quantify levels of quality and service readiness in line with national standards,
although few countries offered a conceptual definition of quality in their manuals.
Patient satisfaction is also endorsed as a dimension of quality across PBF programs (also see Accountability).
Cameroon’s household survey form for verification asks, “Was the mother well received in the health
facility?” In Tanzania, the quality assessment tools for dispensaries and health centers list a patient satisfaction
survey as part of its verification process. Most of the other countries also include patient satisfaction surveys
among their verification tools, but they are not necessarily listed on the quality assessment scales.
There are many indicators of quality in PBF implementation, many captured under acceptability, accessibility,
and availability. Three other dimensions of quality are (1) technical competencies, (2) facility readiness, and (3)
privacy and confidentiality. Quality checklists in Nigeria were updated for PBF programming to give greater
weight to the content of healthcare, namely staff competency and performance. In Tanzania, client FP cards
are randomly selected to check whether the clients were correctly examined and counseled on FP methods
and choice. Cameroon checks for whether all FP consultations are carried out by at least one Brevete (French
for “qualified” or “patented”) nurse in health centers and whether there is at least one State registered nurse
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trained in FP at hospitals. In Lesotho, quality of work is a measure of staff performance. Its checklist enquires
if staff are "adhering to specific work-related norms and standards.” PBF also dictates that health centers are
required to have at least three qualified staff, per ministry of health (MOH) guidelines, and that buildings and
equipment meet MOH standards (including the availability of water, and electricity or solar power). For
Kenya’s PBF program, it is important that health workers correctly calculate the target population for FP
services and that staff are trained on screening. Similarly, Cameroon’s program clearly states that it expects
health staff to make accurate calculations of the expected monthly targets for IUD, tubal ligations, and
vasectomies.
Facility preparedness or readiness is also a frequent measure of quality. Kenya’s program checks whether a
facility is ready to provide FP by verifying the level of contraceptive stock (injectables, orals, implants,
condoms, and IUCDs). In Lesotho, monitoring and verification of whether clinical equipment (scales,
sphygmomanometer, specula, lights, gloves, disinfectants/decontaminants, Ayre's spatula, cervical brushes,
slides and fixatives, and IUD insertion kits) is available and working is within the PBF plan. Cameroon
includes many preparedness indicators on its quality assessment checklists, and while there are distinct
checklists for health centers and hospitals, there are some shared measures between the two: (a) the presence
of a wall chart, picture book, or flip chart with demonstrations of different modern FP methods (see
Acceptability); (b) an existing security stock of oral and injectable contraceptives; (c) at least five IUD
methods and at least five Norplan available and staff capable of placing them; (d) a strategy in place to refer
couples for tubal ligation and/or vasectomy (see Availability); (e) the availability of an FP register that is wellfilled and current; (f) completion of all rubrics; and (g) the availability of completed FP forms (blood pressure,
weight, vericose [sic] veins). Cameroon’s hospital quality checklist also looks for whether the hospital business
plan has a “convincing strategy to cover family planning,” which should include the (a) integration of hospital
staff, (b) collaboration with the private sector and the community relays agents, and (c) an outreach strategy
and advocacy with traditional or local leaders.
Privacy and/or confidentiality were often mentioned repeatedly across country manuals. Assurances of
privacy and confidentiality are indicated by the PBF programs in Cameroon, Kenya, Lesotho, and Tanzania.
These principles are measured by individual service provision and full privacy during the service in Tanzania,
ensuring consultation spaces are available, windows, blinds, or curtains in Cameroon and Kenya, no direct
passage between rooms through which other people might have to walk in Cameroon, non-transparent glass
in Kenya, and rooms with closed doors in all countries.
In summary, alongside technical competency, facility readiness, privacy, and confidentiality, which are all
aspects of quality, the ways PBF programs define and measure quality overlap other principles, most notably
accessibility, acceptability, and availability (see relevant subsections). What is unique about quality is that it is
often explicitly built into program operations through the quality checklist and performance metrics. Across
the operational manuals, dimensions of quality are captured in performance and quality measures, rewards,
and verification procedures.
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Discussion
Placing people and their needs at the center of the design and implementation of PBF health programs is the
cornerstone of a rights-based approach and doing so promotes health equity. PBF utilizes incentives, often
monetary, to encourage good practices in healthcare delivery and utilization. Focusing attention on quality of
care, informed choice, and voluntarism within the context of a rights-based approach to PBF could help to
encourage positive behaviors by health sector actors and counterbalance the risk of perverse and unintended
outcomes.
Health systems’ administration and programming must align and further governments’ responsibilities to their
citizens. Expanding accountability mechanisms within PBF programs can strengthen the health systems
governance by including the voice of clients and communities, increasingly the likelihood that their needs are
fully met through PBF programming. This is particularly interesting as ministries of health and finance are
government agencies and are often chief managers of PBF programs. Improved governance of health systems
might improve the quality of healthcare and simultaneously expand effective health services to more people.
Recent publications have called for rethinking PBF verification to reduce the risk of harming consumers PBF
is intended to serve. Thinkwell co-founder Yogesh Rajkotia argues that “international development doesn’t
care about patient privacy” as he described how he saw PBF verification processes undermining patient
privacy and confidentiality (Rajkotia, 2018). Another report argues that PBF implementation was hastily and
poorly integrated into health systems, failing to attend to necessary long-term, systemwide reforms, such as
working conditions for human resources, transparency, and accountability (Paul et al., 2018b). These calls for
reform align with GFF’s own recommendations to incorporate a dynamic risk assessment, greater privacy and
patient confidentiality, and anticipate indicator verification in the design phase of program development
(Vergeer et al, 2016). There is a well-recognized need for purposive incorporation of rights principles into
PBF design to both fortify and legitimize the PBF strategy in the development space.

CURRENT STATE OF PRINCIPLES RELATED TO A RIGHTS-BASED
APPROACH IN PBF IMPLEMENTATION
Although specific principles are upheld in PBF operational manuals, across the manuals reviewed there is
inconsistent inclusion of principles for a rights-based approach to PBF programs. Only one program,
Argentina’s Plan Nacer, directly spoke to protecting or championing the rights of FP, or any healthcare,
clients. All the countries advance the essence of at least one of the principles in their targets, monitoring, and
rewards; and some are aligned with multiple principles. However, PBF programs generally do not employ a
rights-based approach to health program development and service delivery. Based on this scoping review,
PBF operational documents at the country level do not explicitly incorporate a rights-based framework, but
they address specific principles in the design and implementation of PBF programs. Those principles
generally measured by PBF programs tend to be those that are easier to observe, making them more
quantifiable and amenable for data collection by health service actors and verification parties. For instance,
the number of low-income service users or the number of service delivery points in hard-to-reach locations
are countable and verifiable.
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GAPS IN INCLUSION OF PRINCIPLES RELATED TO AN RBA IN PBF
PROGRAMS
Partial recognition of rights principles
Except for the principle of agency, all the principles are included to some extent across the reviewed
documents, but most principles are only narrowly addressed. For instance, physical dimensions of
accessibility were addressed in a few programs, but there was little to no emphasis on financial or information
dimensions of accessibility. Under the right to non-discrimination and the principle of equity, disadvantage
and discrimination due to income and ethnicity were addressed, yet an important dimension of disadvantage,
namely adolescence, was neglected. This section highlights gaps in the inclusion of three principles among
the PBF manuals reviewed.

Absence of the Principle of Agency
In the operations manuals, the only principle strikingly absent was that of agency, which was grouped with
autonomy, empowerment, and voluntarism for this review. Agency implies people know their right to make
FP decisions and can make their own decisions about contraceptive use. It should be noted, however, that
the definitions for these principles intersect; and informed choice/informed decision-making, for which there
was some inclusion, albeit minimal, focused on the provision of comprehensive FP information to help
clients with decision making. These principles, while discussed with regard for family planning, are imperative
to all healthcare programs. Clients should be active and engaged participants in their healthcare use. In the
case of family planning, clients must make voluntary, informed decisions about contraceptive use, for which
the principle of agency is critical.

Lack of Downward Accountability
Accountability was the only principle addressed by every PBF implementation manual reviewed. However,
most of the accountability systems are internal, horizontal performance systems that are explained in detail
for PBF verification purposes, connecting health service actors to PBF regulators and funders. The manuals
focus largely on the major players in supply-side PBF schemes, (a) funders, (b) regulators/verifiers, and (c)
health service providers, and the contracts among and between these agents. The implementation manuals
and contracts concentrate on the roles and responsibilities of each as well as the contracted services that are
eligible for financial reward. They do not discuss how healthcare users should be or are expected to be
included in and served by the health system. In this way, there was negligible inclusion of downward
accountability to clients. The responsibility of health programs to clients is determined through (a) client
surveys, (b) exit interviews, (c) verification observations, and (d) reviews of various facility registers for very
few and specific details, such as whether the client was truly served by a facility. As such, accountability
measures in current PBF implementation documents do not speak to accountability to the communities
served, which would require client and community participation in program design and implementation
beyond satisfaction surveys.

Incomplete notion of quality
Quality, a principal performance measure in PBF, provides an interesting challenge for many PBF programs
because its definition is broad and subjective, and its performance measures remain confusing. Additionally,
other principles (accessibility, availability, and acceptability) can overlap to some degree with notional aspects
of quality. It would be helpful if quality in PBF was based on a clearly-defined theoretical framework. For
more than 25 years, the FP field has been guided by the Bruce FP Quality of Care (QOC) Framework (Bruce,
1990). Recently, Jain has proposed a revision of the FP QOC Framework (see Box 1) that aligns it with
definitions of quality of care in frameworks for rights-based FP (WHO, 2014; FP2020, 2014; Hardee et al.,
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2014). This revised FP QOC framework could serve this purpose. The PBF implementation manuals tend
to focus more on supply-side quality (largely not from the consumer experience) and do not explain the
selection of quality indicators included in the country manual.

Focus on supply over demand
Finally, the PBF implementation manuals reviewed focused on supply-side financial incentives and RBF
“encompasses the entire range of incentive approaches on both the demand and the supply sides” (Fritsche,
Soeters, & Meessen, 2014). While there are programs inclusive of or focused on demand-side schemes, these
were not presented in the reviewed manuals. Demand-side programs are important for their focus on the
barriers and constraints faced by the consumers trying to access desired services. They are, therefore, more
directly responsive to consumer needs than programs aimed at health system strengthening and performance.
Box 1: Revised FP Quality of Care Framework
Structure (quality of services or readiness of services to provide intended level of care)
¨ Choice of methods
¨ Availability of the appropriate number and type of methods
¨ Required equipment to provide the range of methods
¨ Availability of space to ensure audio and visual privacy
¨ Availability of appropriate constellation of reproductive health services
¨ Availability of trained/competent provider in:
o Providing contraceptive methods safely by ensuring compliance with correct medical
procedures and infection prevention practices
o Treating clients with dignity and respect
o Appropriate information exchange with clients
Process (quality of care offered to clients and received by them)
¨ Appropriate information exchange with clients to ensure:
o Selection of a method appropriate to client’s needs and circumstances by soliciting
information from them about their reproductive intentions, family circumstances,
prior use of contraception, and preferred method; and by providing information on
alternate methods appropriate to their needs
o Effective contraceptive use by informing clients about such items as how to use the
method selected, potential side effects and how to manage them if they occur
o Continuity of care and contraceptive use by informing clients when to come back for
resupply and possibility of switching the method, provider, or service outlet
whenever the selected method/provider/outlet does not remain suitable
¨ Interpersonal relations including:
o Treating clients with dignity and respect
o Ensuring audio and visual privacy and confidentiality

Source: Jain and Hardee, 2018
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Limitations
This report has been limited to the review of country-specific operations manuals for PBF programs. It does
not include a full review of other PBF operational documents developed by nongovernmental agencies,
which may have sourced different data or outlined other implementation approaches. Additionally, not all
existing PBF operations or implementation manuals have been reviewed. Only those sourced through web
searches and expert consultations in 2017 were included.
Other resources like project appraisal documents (PAD) and investment cases (IC) may illuminate whether
geographic targeting was based on equity considerations. From conversations with one GFF representative, it
seems as if this may be the case in some country investments. In an internal review of PADs and IC
documents prior to reviewing the 23 implementation manuals, Population Council researchers did not locate
discussions of equity targeting; however, further research is warranted if only to surface evidence of rights
principles is existing documents and acknowledge the past efforts in this regard.
This evidence mapping of PBF operational documents sorted current PBF design and implementation
elements according to the selected rights principles. As PBF aligns with the wider interest in strategic
purchasing in universal health coverage and is a technical strategy for which countries increasingly seek GFF
support, systematically incorporating rights principles into PBF program design beforehand becomes an ever
greater priority.
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Recommendations and Conclusion
A significant share of the technical support in designing PBF programs is administered by the World Bank
and funded by contributing governments that have signed on to international agreements to ensure citizens
the right to the highest attainable standard of health. The review identified a need for a clearer articulation
and prioritization of all principles to a rights-based approach throughout the PBF lifecycle, from investment
cases to PADs and into PBF operational manuals and program tools. What is currently missing in the PBF
programs is a client orientation. There is a particular need for more attention on agency, informed choice, and
availability, which were absent or poorly represented in this evidence mapping. All rights principles should be
clearer and consistent throughout countries’ PBF programs and included in how country requests for support
are assessed by GFF and partners. Relevant guidance materials ought to be developed to sensitize and
support country teams when developing PBF programs. Using the existing documentation from FP2020
would be a good start for this (http://www.familyplanning2020.org/microsite/rightsinfp). Core indicators
14-16 at FP2020’s Track20 can be considered for assessment and potentially for rewarding performance.
Current PBF guidance lacks a right principles framework and could draw from FP communities of practice to
develop a practical implementation scheme oriented toward client rights. The PBF theory of change is framed
as an empowering, equitable, efficient, and effective approach to strengthening health systems, yet in the
operational guidance, it often focuses on empowerment and autonomy of the provider and facility; a similarly
strong emphasis on the client is needed for better health outcomes.
The review notes that most of the implementation manuals identified here were developed prior to the
establishment of the GFF. The GFF Business Plan declares that “equity, gender, and rights underpin and are
mainstreamed throughout the GFF’s work” and that country ownership and guidance are some of its guiding
principles. As such, the GFF provides an opportunity for a renewed, concerted focus on integrating rights
principles into PBF design, as it influences agent behavior in a classic principal-agent arrangement. Under
PBF in the health sector, agents are often the facility-based providers, and to some extent the district
administration. Just as governments are expected to work towards the progressive realization of their citizens’
rights, an iterative learning process is critical to operationalizing a rights-based PBF program.
Some important questions have been addressed by this evidence mapping; gaps with respect to particular
rights principles have been identified. A second report from the same research effort explores the rightsbased approach to PBF indicators for FP services. Both reports provide an assessment of the state of rights
principles articulation and operationalization in PBF programs for FP services.
From the results presented here, there is a clear opportunity for future operations manuals to more explicitly
and systematically address rights principles. How rights principles are incorporated into implementation will
require a thoughtful, iterative approach that documents the efforts made while accounting for contextual
variation. Determining the programmatic structure of a fully operational rights-based approach in any PBF
program is guided by international agreement on a rights principles framework for family planning programs
as well as local stakeholder contextualization in the respective health system.
Going forward, PBF operations manuals ought to summarize their PBF theory of change from a rights-based
approach to implementation. Given its centrality to funding through the GFF partners, PBF for FP services
will have significant implications on the abilities of women and couples to choose if, when, and how many
children to bear in their lifetimes. Placing consumers at the heart of services and ensuring they are always
prioritized and protected when designing, planning, and implementing PBF programs is critical to ensuring
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that people are able to make their own decisions about FP use and to sustaining PBF programs, particularly in
countries supported by GFF.
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